Deterring China’s Military Aggression: DoD Strategic Options for Securing the Western Pacific

Photo by Adrian Askew on Flickr 

By Andrew Faulhaber

The United States and China are on a crash course toward large-scale conflict in the Western Pacific. For 75 percent of historic cases over the past 500 years when a rising great power challenged the supremacy of a status quo power, military conflict ensued.[1] We are at a pivotal turning point in global affairs where an awakened and increasingly aggressive China is actively confronting the supremacy of the United States, which has maintained leadership of the liberal international order since the end of World War II.[2] Many of China’s core interests in the Western Pacific are at odds with those of the United States and our regional allies. Further, they have enacted policies and actions which have threatened to disrupt regional peace and stability. This clash of interests increases the odds of escalatory conflict in the region. 

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) needs a comprehensive strategy that will deter China from its revisionist agenda to upset the international rules-based order and its coercive actions in the Western Pacific. To do this, the U.S. military needs a strategy that not only promotes vital U.S. national interests but also relays the credible use of force to deter Chinese aggression and is sustainable over the long-haul of strategic competition with China. Three strategic options will be presented; however, the strategy of Integrated Deterrence 2.0 (which expands upon the DoD’s current strategy of Integrated Deterrence) is the most optimal strategy to pursue due to its ability to harness the combined power of U.S. strategic alliances and partnerships globally toward deterring Chinese aggression, while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of large-scale conflict with China.[3]

Before delving into the various strategic options, it is imperative to first understand how the United States and China got to this point. In 1972 the United States and China began to normalize relations; however, China altered its strategic calculus regarding the United States after three major events: the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the 1991 U.S. military victory over Iraq, and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.[4] These three events signaled to China that its principal interest of regime survival could easily be upended by the supremacy of U.S. soft power or through military means. Although relations between the two countries after this time period sometimes resembled cooperation, the overall theme of this new era for China was fear. This fear prompted China to focus on restructuring the world from the U.S.-led liberal world order to a realist zero-sum order where China is the dominant regional power.[5] China now believes that to achieve this it must become a regional hegemon in the Western Pacific and contest American primacy on the international stage. Specifically, China wants to decrease America’s relative power through undermining its alliances, and eventually pushing the U.S. military out of the Western Pacific, while at the same time bolstering its own economic and military industrial output to contest the United States if necessary.[6]

Regionally, China maintains three core interests in the Western Pacific: regime survival, securing territorial integrity (including unifying with Taiwan), and protecting vital shipping routes (especially through the Malacca Strait).[7] To protect these interests and achieve its national goals, China’s military strategy, called Active Defense, focuses on upending the U.S. military presence and alliances in the Western Pacific (especially in the First Island Chain) through a combination of offensive and defensive measures.[8] Besides having the largest army and navy in the world to act as a conventional deterrence, China also focuses its defense on anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities.[9] These asymmetric capabilities include integrated air defense systems (e.g., S-300, S-400, HQ-19), anti-ship cruise missiles (e.g., YJ-83, YJ-62, etc.), and ground-launched short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles (e.g., DF-26) with the ability to reach Guam in the Second Island Chain.[10] The advancement of its A2AD capabilities has allowed China the freedom to maneuver further into the Pacific and to potentially hold regional U.S. military bases hostage in the event of conflict. 

Offensively, China has militarily challenged U.S. allies’ sovereignty and freedom of navigation in both the South and East China Seas through claiming additional maritime territory, establishing its own air defense identification zone over disputed areas, creating and militarizing artificial islands, as well as engaging in information warfare and advanced cyber operations.[11] China has also deployed other tools of national power such as economic coercion and wolf-warrior diplomacy to supplement its military might in achieving its strategic goals. These coercive measures show a clear disregard for international law (especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and are meant to bend countries toward China’s will, while creating strategic depth for China.[12] Given the string of U.S. and allied bases surrounding China, it is no surprise that they have taken to the offensive. The Chinese sense of strategic vulnerability and the subsequent response to proliferate advanced weaponry and aggressively advance its own interests will only be further exacerbated over time as the United States continues to build up its forces in the Western Pacific.

Due to clashing interests, the main flashpoints that could spark a conflict between the United States and China are a Taiwan invasion scenario, military accident (collision between naval vessels or planes), cyber escalation, or a conflict sparked by a third party.[13] While these flashpoints and Chinese A2AD capabilities present challenges for the U.S. military’s operational environment, the DoD still has four main sources of power it can leverage to deter China’s coercive military actions in the Western Pacific. These are primarily the United States’ strong regional and global alliances and partnerships, being backed by the rule of international law, having a powerful military spending capacity due to a strong and innovative economy, and its forward-deployed military presence and basing in the region. The ability to develop and maintain its regional treaty alliances (with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand) and partnerships (with Taiwan, India, New Zealand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Mongolia, Singapore, and the Pacific Islands) will prove to be the decisive element of success for U.S. military strategy in the region.[14] While these sources of power are not an exhaustive list, they provide a list of tools that the United States can rely on when carrying out its military strategy. 

No strategy at the national level is complete without a thorough understanding of which U.S. national interests are at stake.[15] The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy articulates three core national interests: “to protect the security of the American people; to expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and to realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.”[16] While this provides the President’s strategic vision for the future of U.S. national security, the DoD must translate these aims toward actionable military objectives. For the purposes of deterring Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific, the DoD should break these down into short-term objectives (next five years) and long-term objectives (over five years), to delineate how certain actions taken will inevitably have varying consequences in both the near-term and future. Below is a breakdown of the most pertinent objectives the DoD should consider when assessing the best strategy for deterring China.

Figure 1: Suggested DoD Objectives

The Department of Defense has three strategic options that can be applied to successfully deter China in the Western Pacific: Integrated Deterrence 2.0, Indirect Defense, and Active Denial. Each strategy is distinct in its following of a specific grand strategy but is non-contiguous and will overlap on specific actions for accomplishing the overall strategic aim. However, the main goal of all three strategies is the same: deterrence of Chinese military aggression in the Western Pacific in order to optimize U.S. vital interests regionally and globally. In the long-term the most realistic and preferred outcome for the United States should be a lasting peace in the greater Indo-Pacific region through a suitable détente with China.[17]

Strategic Option 1: Integrated Deterrence 2.0

Integrated Deterrence 2.0 is focused on deterring China through bolstering pre-existing alliances and partnerships and establishing future relationships with other nations by sharing knowledge, building joint capabilities, establishing congruent strategies, and combining military operations. It effectively takes the current DoD strategy of Integrated Deterrence and expands further upon the already established foundations of joint and allied operations. This strategy morphs together a deterrence by denial strategy with a deterrence by punishment strategy.[18] To effectively reduce the chances of conflict and ensure the continuation of U.S. and allied core national interests, other forms of national power (e.g., geoeconomic, diplomatic, legal, etc.) through a whole-of-government approach will need to be first-use tools to punish China when they break international law.[19] U.S. and allied militaries should be used as a deterrence mechanism, and only engage in large-scale denial operations as a tool of last resort if a serious infringement of national sovereignty occurs (e.g., Taiwan invasion).

Two areas that need expanded cooperation with allied and partnered countries are intelligence sharing and cyber defense. The 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy does not mention any action regarding intelligence sharing for defense purposes and only loosely discusses soft cooperation with Western Pacific nations on cyber defense.[20] Intelligence drives operations and without it, it is not possible to respond promptly to fluid threats, especially in an area as vast as the Pacific Ocean. Cyber, on the other hand, is an evolving tool China employs to accomplish its national objectives and one they estimate will play a “decisive role in any future conflict.”[21] The United States and its allies in the region must be ready to respond to malicious threats within their networks if command and control (C2) and national digital information systems are to be protected and preserved in peace and war. That is why this strategy advocates for the establishment of both an Indo-Pacific Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center and an Indo-Pacific Cyber Defense Center (similar to NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence).[22] These two centers would be jointly manned by U.S. and allied forces with the mission of protecting critical networks, exchanging technology and critical information, and educating each other on best cyber defense and intelligence practices. While the road-block of classification would need to be addressed for both centers, these centers would facilitate allied integration and getting timely and accurate information to the right parties at the right time, as well as protecting vital national and military digital infrastructure and sensitive information.[23]

Each branch of the U.S. military has other areas where it can expand its cooperation with allies and partners. The Army’s new Multi-Domain Task Forces and the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations should speed up the integration of partner forces in their exercises and day-to-day operations.[24] The U.S. Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) through the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait should also increase with allies and partners. The United States conducted thirty-five FONOPs from May 2015 through 2021, with only four conducted during the Biden administration’s first year.[25] To ensure that China understands the resolve of the United States and its like-minded partners as well as the power that could be brought to bear during a kinetic conflict, the number of joint U.S. and partner force FONOPs should increase. 

Strategic Option 2: Indirect Defense

An alternate strategy to DoD’s heavily involved strategy is a revisionist one, Indirect Defense. Unlike DoD’s Integrated Deterrence strategy, where the United States takes a more explicit leadership role as the “cornerstone balancer,” Indirect Defense instead relies on regional allies to bear the main burden of deterrence and defense to counter China.[26] This strategy is most akin to the grand strategy of Offshore Balancing, which argues that the United States should take a lesser role in global defense through mostly advising regional allied forces and supplying weapons (albeit still preventing regional hegemons), engaging in war only as a last resort in critical regions to U.S. vital interests, and repurposing money from DoD to support development efforts back home.[27] Indirect Defense is focused on long-term sustainability to effectively compete over the long-haul of strategic competition with China.

This strategy may at first seem foreign to leaders in the DoD, but its outcomes in modern and historic warfare have yielded many successes on the battlefield. If we have learned anything since the end of the Vietnam War, it is that conventional militaries and capabilities are no longer the guaranteed decisive force for a stronger attacking nation. Recent history in Ukraine and Afghanistan have given credence to the opinion that a weaker yet more motivated power, who utilizes asymmetric forces or capabilities and who has a better strategy and ability to sustain weapons procurement, can subdue a substantially stronger power over the long-term. Deterrence may have been ineffective for the defending force before the onset of conflict, but a protracted war that appears to never end will force the attacking nation to capitulate due to domestic and international political considerations. This happened to the United States in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and it is starting to happen to Russia now in Ukraine. Supplying advanced weapons and information to the defending force, such as was the case for the United States against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s and now for the United States. against Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, is an optimal way to achieve strategic ends with little cost to American lives or budget.[28]

Instead of building expensive ships and aircraft to increase our forward-deployed presence in the Western Pacific, this strategy suggests the United States should instead arm allied and partner countries with asymmetric capabilities. The most effective weapons would consist of anti-air (e.g., Patriot and Stinger missiles), anti-ship (e.g., Hsiung Feng III missiles), anti-tank (e.g., NLAW and Javelin), and certain ballistic missiles (e.g., Common Hypersonic Glide Body, once it becomes operational) just to name a few.[29] These would ensure costly effects for China, for instance, if they pursued an invasion of Taiwan. The United States would effectively be pursuing a deterrence by punishment strategy in that it ensures China would refrain from initiating conflict in the first place due to expected heavy losses, reduced chances of military success, and negative long-term geopolitical consequences (e.g., sanctions).[30] 

Strategic Option 3: Active Denial

As DoD continues to transition its posture to the greater Indo-Pacific region, it is easy to overlook the success China has had in its maritime expansion. China has been able to expand into the Spratly Islands, successfully blockade the Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoals, and contest the national sovereignty of multiple allied and partner nations (including Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and others).[31] DoD has thus far failed to deter coercive action in the South and East China Seas. This is the basic premise that underlies the last strategy presented: Active Denial. This strategy effectively says enough is enough. DoD will create multiple red-lines and clearly communicate these and the potential consequences to China. It is a hard-nosed strategy that is focused purely on deterrence by denial in that it will prevent China by force from taking any further illegal military actions in the Indo-Pacific.[32]

Just as China recently dictated to South Korea their “three Nos” for South Korea’s defense policies and weapons procurement if they do not want to face consequences, so too will the United States dictate their ‘Three Nos’ to China: no new island building, no violent contests of allied sovereignty, and no restricting the freedom of movement in the global commons.[33] This would effectively mean restricting China’s aggressive naval activity to its own borders, that being its twelve nautical miles of maritime territory.[34] While the Chinese Navy (PLAN) could still move outside of this area, it would no longer be permitted to pursue Beijing’s regional aspirations through coercive means.

In order to enforce this new standard of compliance, the United States will need to create a formalized Indo-Pacific NATO equivalent. The makings for this are already in progress with the Quad, AUKUS, and the ever-deteriorating nature of countries’ global relations with China due to their aggressive and coercive policies.[35] A formalized alliance of nations in the Indo-Pacific would provide the necessary capacity to balance China, and in the long-term alter their perception of what could be accomplished militarily. To do this, the United States needs to increase its budget to the DoD to provide the sufficient funds to embark on a massive ship and aircraft building campaign, and to proliferate advanced weaponry and technology to allies (similar to the nuclear submarine technology transfer to Australia within AUKUS).[36] While this would greatly increase deterrence against China’s military aggression, it would also mean likely reducing the U.S. domestic budget for other critical sectors such as upgrading deteriorating infrastructure, research and development, education, and other crucial areas of discretionary spending. There is also a possibility that Indo-Pacific states will not want to hedge against China, due to putting their economies at risk, though if China continues to pursue their revisionist agenda, states may have no other recourse than to join a coalition of the willing to balance against China.[37]

When comparing the three strategic options against each other it is important to keep in mind the main objectives DoD is trying to accomplish (addressed previously on Figure 1), in line with U.S. core national interest. Quantitative analysis conducted utilizing the U.S. Army’s Course of Action Decision-Making Matrix (depicted below) indicates that Integrated Deterrence 2.0 is the most even-keeled strategy, in terms of balancing effectiveness for both short and long-term objectives. Indirect Defense, however, tends to be best suited for accomplishing short-term objectives due to its more laissez faire approach which will decrease tensions initially, yet entice China to attempt aggressive military actions (especially an invasion of Taiwan) over the long-run due to a decreased U.S. military presence in the region. Similarly, Active Denial tends to be best suited for accomplishing long-term objectives due to significant deterrence measures against China emanating from joint U.S. and allied superior combat power vis a vis the Chinese military.[38] This strategy, however, would significantly escalate tensions between the United States and China in the short-term and is much more likely to spark a major conflict.

Matrix 1: See endnote for how to interpret the matrix.[39]

Both Indirect Defense and Active Denial’s results are too volatile for accomplishing DoD’s main objectives and will likely be off-putting to allies if pursued. Integrated Deterrence 2.0 is the strategy that should be pursued due to its ability to leverage multiple sources of power (e.g., alliances, military, geoeconomic, diplomatic, legal, etc.) in a responsible way, showing China that even if they are not completely denied at first from their limited military objectives in the Western Pacific, they will find more countries hedging against them over the long-run.[40] China will ultimately be unable to sustain their aggressive and coercive actions in the Western Pacific, thus being deterred over the long-haul of strategic competition with the United States.

As Thucydides reminds us, countries go to war for three reasons: fear, interests, and honor.[41] The United States would be wise to ensure its strategy and military actions do not tip the scale toward conflict over any of these reasons. The 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy seems to heed this wisdom: “Our objective is not to change the PRC but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates.”[42] DoD’s current strategy of Integrated Deterrence and the expanded version, Integrated Deterrence 2.0, provides the best approach to alter the strategic environment by balancing strategic objectives and interests, with expected short and long-term outcomes, while avoiding all-out war with China. 

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper reflect the personal opinions and analysis of the author alone, and do not express the policy of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

About the Author

Andrew Faulhaber is a captain in the U.S. Army, who has served in an array of tactical and strategic positions in both the military and U.S. government.  He graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 2018 with a BA in International Studies, History, and Arabic. He also received his Master’s in International Relations from Harvard University in 2021.

Endnotes

  1. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (Boston, MA: Mariner Books, 2018), vii, viii.

  2. Stephen Brooks, and William Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), xi.

  3. United States Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2022), 8, 9.

  4. Maria Adele Carrai, Jennifer Rudolph, and Michael Szonyi, eds., The China Questions 2: Critical Insights Into US-China Relations, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2022), 71.; Matthew Pottinger, U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, The United States’ Strategic Competition with China, 117th Congress, June 8, 2021.

  5. United States White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 2022), 5.

  6. Andrew Latham, “Offshore Balancing with Chinese Characteristics,” The Strategy Bridge, July 2, 2021, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/7/2/offshore-balancing-with-chinese-characteristics.

  7. Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior. Part One: On ‘Core Interests,” China Leadership Monitor 34, no. 22 (2011): 3, 4.

  8. United States Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), ix, 24.

  9. Ibid, vii.

  10. Ibid, 52, 59.

  11. Nicholas Khoo, “Interstate Rivalry in East Asia,” in The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190680015.013.30, 7.; Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S. Reveron, eds., China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 15, 17.

  12.  United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. (Montego Bay, Jamaica: United Nations, 1982), 27, 43, 44.; Kevin Rudd, “Understanding China's Rise Under Xi Jinping,” Speech to U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Asia Society, March 5, 2018, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/understanding-chinas-rise-under-xi-jinping. 

  13. Ryan Hass, Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021), 135.

  14. United States White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (2022), 9.

  15. Graham T. Allison, and Robert Blackwill, “America’s National Interests: A Report from The Commission on America’s National Interests,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (2000): 13.

  16. United States White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2022), 7.

  17. Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021), xvii.

  18. Melanie W. Sisson, “Taiwan and the Dangerous Illogic of Deterrence by Denial,” Brookings (2022): 1, 3.

  19. Robert D. Blackwill, Jennifer Harris, and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 1, 256.; United States Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019), 6.

  20. United States White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (2022), 8, 16. 

  21. Lindsay, Cheung, and Reveron, eds., China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, 17.

  22. Wade Turvold, Deon Canyon, and Jim McMullin, “A Network of Maritime Fusion Centers Throughout the Indo-Pacific,” Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2021, https://apcss.org/nexus_articles/a-network-of-maritime-fusion-centers-throughout-the-indo-pacific/.; Simon Handler, “The 5×5-the US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Cybersecurity Relationship,” Atlantic Council, August 15, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/the-5x5/the-5x5-the-us-japan-south-korea-trilateral-cybersecurity-relationship/. 

  23. Turvold, Canyon, and McMullin, “A Network of Maritime Fusion Centers Throughout the Indo-Pacific.”

  24. United States Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region (2019), 20.

  25. Carrai, Rudolph, and Szonyi, eds., The China Questions 2: Critical Insights Into US-China Relations, Vol. 2, 235.

  26. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, 30, 38.

  27. John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (2016): 71-74.

  28. Bruce Riedel, “Could Ukraine Be Putin's Afghanistan?,” Brookings, February 24, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/24/could-ukraine-be-putins-afghanistan/.

  29. Edward Wong and John Ismay, “U.S. Aims to Turn Taiwan into Giant Weapons Depot,” The New York Times, October 5, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/05/us/politics/taiwan-biden-weapons-china.html.; David Alman, “Don't Buy Warships (Yet),” U.S. Naval Institute, June 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/june/dont-buy-warships-yet.; Scott W. Harold, “Reinforcing U.S. Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific after the Fall of Afghanistan,” RAND Corporation, September 3, 2021, https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/09/reinforcing-us-deterrence-in-the-indo-pacific-after.html.

  30. Sisson, “Taiwan and the Dangerous Illogic of Deterrence by Denial,” 1, 3, 9

  31.  Dennis Blair, U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, Written Testimony of Dennis Blair, July 13, 2016, 2, 3.

  32. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, xv.

  33. Jo He-rim, “China Demands Korea Uphold 'Three Nos' Policy,” The Korea Herald, July 28, 2022, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220728000666.

  34. United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 27.

  35. Justin L. Diehl, “Indo-Pacific Deterrence and the Quad in 2030,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University Press, January 29, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2486944/indo-pacific-deterrence-and-the-quad-in-2030/.; Luke Patey, How China Loses: The Pushback Against Chinese Global Ambitions (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2021), 14, 15.

  36. Brent Sadler, “Rebuilding America's Military: The United States Navy,” The Heritage Foundation, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/rebuilding-americas-military-the-united-states-navy.; Jane Hardy, “Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific: Advancing the Australia-United States Alliance,” United States Studies Centre, October 15, 2021, https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/integrated-deterrence-in-the-indo-pacific-advancing-the-australia-united-states-alliance.

  37.  David Shambaugh, Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast Asia (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), 11, 14, 250.

  38. Mangesh Sawant, “Why China Cannot Challenge the US Military Primacy,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University Press, December 13, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Dec/12/2002907684/-1/-1/1/2021%20-%20SAWANT.PDF.

  39. United States Department of the Army, FM 6-0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, C2 edition (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), 9-39.; 

    How to interpret matrix 1: the lowest number per criteria is the optimal strategy to accomplish that objective and the lowest number for ‘Weighted Total’ is the most optimal strategy overall. The ‘Weight’ is the level of importance that criteria holds in line with the overall goal of deterring China. The unweighted score has a value of 1, 2, or 3 denoting the most optimal strategy by criteria as 1 and the least optimal as 3. To get the weighted score for each criteria (as denoted by the number in parentheses) you multiply the unweighted score for each strategy per criteria by the weighted value for that criteria. All weighted and unweighted values are then added horizontally by strategy to give you the final score.

  40. Sisson, “Taiwan and the Dangerous Illogic of Deterrence by Denial,” 1, 3.

  41. Michael O'Hanlon, The Art of War in an Age of Peace: US Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021), 75.

  42. United States White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (2022), 5.

ArticleYale Journal of International AffairsSpring 2023, China, Asia