Haiti’s Crisis: Why an International Conservatorship Is the Only Solution
"Haiti Earthquake.” Source: United Nations Development Programme
Timor-Leste and Cambodia Prove International Governance Can Stabilize Fragile States
By Martin Rodriguez Rodriguez
Haiti’s Descent into Chaos
Haiti is at a breaking point. The state has collapsed, gangs control much of Port-au-Prince [2], and over 1 million people have been internally displaced [3] following a surge in violence and lawlessness that claimed at least 5,000 lives in 2024 alone. [4] In December, the Wharf Jérémie massacre saw 207 people executed [5], underscoring the sheer brutality that now defines daily life in the Caribbean nation.
The country has no elected government, having failed to hold elections since 2016. Its security forces are outgunned and understaffed, and there is no clear path out of its downward spiral. For decades, the international community has attempted peacekeeping operations and aid programs, yet none have provided Haiti with long-term stability. The U.S. alone has sent more than $5 billion in aid since the 2010 earthquake, yet the crisis persists. [6]
Haiti’s political and security collapse, combined with state paralysis, leaves no alternative: an international conservatorship under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter is necessary to restore order and rebuild governance. Designed to address threats to global peace and security, Chapter VII equips the UN Security Council to act when diplomacy or other efforts to stabilize a crisis have failed. In cases of total state collapse, like Haiti’s, the council is authorized to take “such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” [7] Simply put, when a state can no longer credibly perform its most basic functions—protecting its citizens and maintaining order—a conservatorship is not a choice but an obligation.
The idea may seem unorthodox, even unpalatable to those deeply familiar with Haiti’s tragic history and the specter of “neo-colonialism.” Critics will surely argue that a conservatorship would override local agency and foster dependency rather than self-sufficiency. And whilst those are valid concerns rooted in historical precedent, history also demonstrates that temporary international administration has successfully stabilized fragile states. When domestic institutions collapse, external governance can restore order and create a viable path toward self-rule. A well-designed, time-limited, internationally backed conservatorship can do the same for Haiti.
Lessons from Timor-Leste and Cambodia
This approach is not theoretical; it has worked before. The UN and international coalitions have stepped in to stabilize failed or war-torn states, overseeing transitions that would have been daunting, if not chaotic, without external support. In Timor-Leste (1999–2002), the United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTAET) restored security, established legal institutions, and oversaw elections, paving the way for full independence. Led by the late Sérgio Vieira de Mello [8], UNTAET exercised full executive, legislative, and judicial authority to rebuild governance and ensure stability. UNTAET, whilst imperfect, played a crucial role in establishing legal institutions, training local governance structures, and guiding Timor-Leste toward self-determination, despite criticisms of its centralized approach and initial limitations on local participation. [9]
In Cambodia (1992–1993), the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) guided the country’s political transition after the murderous Khmer Rouge era. UNTAC was established following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, with a mandate that gave the UN broad authority over Cambodia’s governance. It supervised ceasefires, disarmed factions, repatriated refugees, and organized national elections in 1993. The mission faced significant challenges, including Khmer Rouge noncompliance, political violence, and difficulties in enforcing its authority. Nevertheless, UNTAC successfully facilitated the country’s first democratic elections, leading to the adoption of a new constitution and the formation of a coalition government. [10]
In each case, international administration was not a violation of sovereignty but a mechanism to restore it. These territories lacked functioning governments capable of ensuring security, rule of law, and democratic legitimacy. Temporary outside governance provided the structure needed to rebuild and achieve self-sufficiency. Haiti’s total breakdown, along with the lack of any plausible path to reclaiming control from armed groups, even with a fully funded and well-equipped Multinational Security Support mission (MSS), makes the case for a conservatorship undeniable.
The Failure of Short-Term Solutions
Haiti’s crisis is not just one of political instability but a complete collapse of governance. Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, the country has descended into a governance vacuum, with no elected government since January 2023 and no functioning parliament since 2019. Criminal gangs have expanded their territorial control, and essential services are either nonexistent or controlled by armed groups, leaving the population defenseless. The overwhelmed national police force is, despite a 2022 arms embargo [11], no match for these groups. Meanwhile, the Kenya-led MSS mission in Haiti remains critically underfunded and is operating with a fraction of the 2,500 personnel it was expected to deploy. [12]
Reinforcements, including small contingents of Kenyan police officers, are trickling in, but the mission remains hampered by funding shortfalls and logistical delays. In the first days of the Trump administration, U.S. financial support was frozen, and although some waivers allowed limited releases, uncertainty continues to undermine its effectiveness. [13]
The slow, unreliable deployment mirrors past international interventions in Haiti, which have been piecemeal and lacking the coherent strategy needed for long-term stability. Critics of previous UN missions might argue that peacekeepers have operated in Haiti for twenty of the past thirty-five years (1993–1996, 2004–2017, 2017–2019) with little success and even disastrous public health [14] and human rights consequences. [15]
However, their narrow mandates and light-footprint approach meant they could only provide a shoestring fix, restoring temporary security without creating conditions for long-term stability. The same mistake is being repeated.
The Kenyan-led mission lacks a governance component, making it yet another half-baked plan. Even if, against all odds, it does manage to pacify the country, it lacks the wherewithal to ensure lasting stability. Case in point: Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), tasked with restoring governance and preparing for elections later this year, has instead become a symbol of dysfunction. [16] Riddled with infighting, corruption allegations, and leadership disputes, it has utterly failed to establish national or international credibility.
Yet, instead of learning from past failures, the same short-sighted approach is being tried again. Neither short-term military deployments nor international aid alone will be enough. As the late historian Barbara Tuchman wrote in The March of Folly, “It qualifies as folly when it is a perverse persistence in a policy demonstrably unworkable or counterproductive.” [17] That is precisely what is unfolding in Haiti today. Without a strategic reset, the crisis will deepen, and the humanitarian catastrophe will worsen.
A Roadmap for Stability and State Viability
And thus, Haiti’s only viable path to stability is an international conservatorship: a UN-mandated, internationally backed transitional authority tasked with restoring governance, rebuilding institutions, ensuring security, and, in due course, organizing elections.
Said conservatorship would operate through a dual-track approach: a robust security mission to dismantle gang networks and a transitional governance authority to restore state functions.
On the security side, an international force composed of vetted regional and international personnel would deploy with a mandate from the UN Security Council and clearly defined rules of engagement, focused not on a restrained peacekeeping mandate but on a forward-leaning posture capable of offensive operations to dismantle armed gangs and secure critical infrastructure. To be effective, the force must be well-resourced and equipped for urban combat, with the authority to arrest, disarm, and coordinate with Haitian police and international intelligence agencies providing support. Without a robust mandate and the political will to act, it risks repeating past failures—present, yet powerless.
In parallel, a civilian-led administration, modeled on past UN transitional authorities, would oversee essential state functions and rebuild institutions whilst preparing Haiti for desperately needed credible elections.
The transitional authority could consist of a blend of international experts and Haitian technocrats and civil servants. Its core mandate would include judicial reform, strengthening civil service capacity, establishing independent oversight mechanisms, and fostering political dialogue on constitutional and electoral reforms. Including credible Haitian leaders from the outset would also help mitigate public resentment and factional infighting ahead of elections. Crucially, it must also address the humanitarian emergency by restoring essential services, ensuring the efficient distribution of food and medical aid, and rebuilding critical infrastructure to stabilize daily life as soon as security conditions permit.
A degree of normalcy can help secure early domestic legitimacy, laying the foundation for what will undoubtedly be a difficult, obstacle-laden transition, one that requires the active support of civil society and political leaders. Though the path ahead will be tortuous, restoring order and functional governance remains the essential first step toward the long-term stability that eluded Haiti for decades.
Sustaining international commitment will also be critical. Past missions faltered when political will waned; this time, staying power will depend on broad burden-sharing, especially given Washington’s limited appetite for involvement. To keep the mission on track, the UN will need clear benchmarks, tight Security Council oversight, and a politically savvy administrator at the helm, someone with clout to navigate Haiti’s volatile landscape and the UN’s notoriously pachydermic bureaucracy.
Ideally, a figure like David Beasley, a maverick former governor of South Carolina and ex-head of the UN World Food Programme (WFP), whose blend of political instincts and operational savvy managed to nudge the UN behemoth into action and coax sustained funding commitments from reluctant international donors, showing it’s possible to make the elephant dance.
Past successful interventions in Timor-Leste and Cambodia prove that pairing security with governance-building is essential for lasting stability and preventing collapse. These cases demonstrate that a structured, internationally backed transition can break the cycle of violence and state failure, ultimately laying the groundwork for a self-sustaining state.
Washington’s long history as the dominant external actor in Haiti [18], through military interventions and aid programs, has fostered deep mistrust, limiting its ability to lead effectively. With little appetite from the Trump Administration for deeper involvement, the door is open for other actors to take the lead. The Organization of American States (OAS), which elected its first Caribbean secretary-general, Suriname’s Foreign Minister Albert Ramdin, in early March [19], alongside the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), France, and Canada, have a chance to step in. Meanwhile, Brazil, always keen to assert its regional influence, has a real opportunity to take responsibility by leading efforts to coordinate a credible response. With both credibility and capacity, Itamaraty is well-positioned to assume a leadership role in a regional response.
Given the failures of the Kenya-led MSS mission and repeated shortcomings of international responses, only a UN Security Council-backed temporary mission can provide the comprehensive approach Haiti urgently needs. Port-au-Prince's deep distrust of past U.S. interventions and Washington’s limited appetite for involvement make a well-coordinated international coalition not just preferable but essential to forging a viable and lasting solution.
An international conservatorship is not about “neocolonialism” or permanent control. It is about acknowledging a hard truth: Haiti’s institutions are too feeble to restore themselves without external support. An international mission built on a dual-track approach would not strip Haiti of its sovereignty; instead, by laying the foundations for a functioning state, it would restore it.
About the author
Martin Rodriguez Rodriguez is a Latin American and Caribbean risk advisor based in Washington, D.C., specializing in commercial diplomacy and strategic communications. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the positions of any affiliated institutions.
Endnotes
"Haiti Earthquake," United Nations Development Programme. Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. https://openverse.org/image/e9df45a6-367b-46cc-acf7-a57525918c3b?q=Haiti&p=13
Vyas, Kejal and Arnesen, Ingrid, "Haitians Flee Gangs on a Mountain Trail ‘Where Even the Dogs Don’t Go’," Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/haiti-port-au-prince-migrants-hiking-trail-1d189e7c.
"Haiti Has 1 Million Displaced People, Mostly from Gang Violence. It’s Tripled over the Past Year," Associated Press, January 14, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/haiti-internally-displaced-gang-violence-un-iom-8cf38a678f02e970ecf1713a77975640
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"Over 207 Executed in Port-au-Prince Massacre: UN Report," UN News, December 23, 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158506.
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Disclaimer
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the editors or the journal.