Russia and the ECOWAS Exodus: A New Energy Crisis?

An Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) building in Lomé, Togo. Source: Edison McCullen

By Eleonora Lucia Cammarano

Europe's nuclear energy supply is at risk after the West African “Brexit”. The decision taken by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), originally intended to promote economic integration across the region, will now disrupt their fragile internal stability. They will turn to Russia for military support in exchange for exclusive access to uranium mines, potentially exposing Europe to energy vulnerability and market recession due to energy price spikes.

The Consequences of the Retreat from ECOWAS

The decision of the juntas to exit ECOWAS has been influenced by their strengthened ties with Russia, their main international backer, and by the expulsion of French forces from the region [1]. In a statement released on January 28th 2024, the interim leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger expressed dissatisfaction with ECOWAS-imposed sanctions primarily triggered by the military takeovers in the three nations between 2020 and 2023 [2]. Leaders in the three countries criticized the economic restrictions, arguing they exacerbated their already struggling economies. Moreover, criticism of ECOWAS was extended to the organization’s ineffectiveness in addressing terrorist threats despite the adoption in 2019 of the 2020–2024 Priority Action Plan to Eradicate Terrorism in the ECOWAS Region [3]. This plan outlined eight interconnected priorities, including the coordination of counter-terrorism efforts, the sharing of information and intelligence, and the promotion of inter-community dialogue. Nevertheless, its implementation has largely been limited to a few training sessions and awareness-raising activities, primarily due to limited resources and conflicting national approaches to the issue. Amid these implementation challenges, tensions within the region have escalated, culminating in the withdrawal of the Sahelian trio—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—from ECOWAS.

This departure not only is detrimental for the trio but also affects their neighboring countries, as they no longer share intelligence and counter-terrorism strategies. In 2022, terrorist attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger accounted for 73% of terrorist deaths in the Sahel and 52% of all deaths from terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa [4]. These attacks perpetrated by groups like Da’esh, Al Qaeda, and their affiliates take advantage of internal instability and popular dissatisfaction to expand their activities across borders.

To address the ongoing terrorist threat and regional security challenges, the Sahelian trio—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—formally established the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in July 2024 [5]. Building on their earlier military cooperation under the Liptako Gourma Charter, the Confederation seeks to create a unified military force to combat terrorism and coordinate joint responses to any acts of aggression [6]. Reflecting a decisive shift toward regional sovereignty, the AES has not only distanced itself from ECOWAS but also severed military ties with Western powers in 2024, replacing foreign troops with Russian mercenaries, particularly from the Wagner Group [7]. While these moves signal a clear break from past alliances, questions remain about the Confederation’s ability to effectively harmonize its defense and political strategies amid persistent instability in the region.

Russia’s Role

Since their ECOWAS withdrawal, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have found themselves cut off from economic and military assistance. With the US withdrawing some troops from Niger [8], the UN ending its peacekeeping mission in Mali [9], and France pulling back from Burkina Faso [10], the three countries are alone to face insurgencies and jihadist attacks. However, Russia stands out as the backing ally with whom the three countries have already signed military cooperation agreements [11].

Following the declaration at the Russia-Africa Summit where participating African states, including the Sahelian trio, expressed a shared intent to deepen cooperation with Russia on economic and security matters— the trio will further seek to strengthen its economic ties with Russia in sectors like energy, mining, and agriculture [12]. Regarding military support, Russian involvement in Africa has largely taken place through private military companies, most notably the Wagner Group. Founded and led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch with close ties to President Vladimir Putin, the Wagner Group played a pivotal role in advancing Russian influence across several African nations by providing security services, military training, and support to regimes facing internal unrest. His death in a plane crash in 2023 left uncertainty about the future of Wagner’s operations abroad. In response, the Kremlin dispatched Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov and Major General Andrei Averyanov of Russia’s military intelligence agency to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to reassure their leaders of Moscow’s continued commitment to security cooperation within their borders [13].

The Russian Energy Blackmail

Russian private security companies claim they can carry out quick and effective counter-insurgency operations. In return, Russia looks to receive concessions for natural resources [14]. As currently done by Mali, the trio’s juntas will reform their mining code to allow foreign concessions to be seized and then allocated to Russian companies. According to Russia’s official proposal, revenues that would have previously gone to Western firms will instead be redirected to fund and expand the operations of Russian private security companies — thereby reinforcing Moscow’s security and political footprint in the region [15].

Russian private military companies are already controlling gold and lithium mines in the region  with plans to control uranium mines in the next year [16]. The three governments are open to selling ownership of uranium mines as Russia’s interest in dominating global uranium supply grows. In 2022, mines in West Africa accounted for a quarter of all European Union uranium imports [17]. If Russian control extends over uranium mines in West Africa, the world will rely on Moscow for energy. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, two countries under the Kremlin’s influence, are among the world’s top uranium producers, accounting for about 50% of the world’s mined supply. Add Western African mines to that, and the share jumps to 60% [18]. 

Given that the European Union sources about a quarter of its uranium imports from West Africa, the widespread control of uranium mines by Russia could lead to a substantial supply shortage for EU countries [19]. While precise estimates of the price increase are challenging due to market volatility, the uranium market is particularly sensitive to supply disruptions due to its relatively inelastic demand. A sudden reduction in supply from major producers can lead to rapid price escalations. Thus, if Russia decides to stop exporting uranium from its controlled regions, European countries could face a shortage of supply leading to a significant increase in fuel prices and putting economies at risk of default.

Recent developments suggest that Russia is willing to leverage its dominant position in the global uranium market as a geopolitical tool. In September 2024, President Vladimir Putin publicly proposed restricting the export of strategic raw materials, including uranium, in response to Western sanctions [20]. The proposal was soon followed by concrete action. In November 2024, Russia imposed temporary restrictions on enriched uranium exports to the United States, citing U.S. legislative measures banning Russian uranium imports [21]. These actions demonstrate Russia's willingness to use uranium exports as a geopolitical tool, and considering the ongoing geopolitical tensions, the possibility of Russia extending similar restrictions to Europe remains a subject of concern.

Effects on the European Energy Market

Russia’s indirect political and military influence over countries with more than 60% of the total uranium supply exposes Europe to energy blackmail, as the Kremlin will use this power to strategically weaken the West. Currently, European countries have enough uranium to sustain the current volume of consumption for the next two years [22]. However, a sudden decrease in uranium supply will increase energy prices creating second-order economic risks.

If the uranium crisis deepens, there risks a widespread rise in inflation. Unless European countries manage to diversify their supply, it is expected that their public debt will rise and so will the general tax level. Such taxes would burden consumers and businesses, potentially leading to economic challenges. If these risks are not effectively managed there could be consequences such as social unrest, business closures, economic recession, and the disruption of internal markets.

Conclusion

The decision to exit the ECOWAS, influenced by the growing relationships with Russia, puts Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger at higher risk of instability. The trio’s military cooperation agreements with Russia will allow the Kremlin to take control over vital resources like uranium. In this aftermath, Europe is more vulnerable in the nuclear market due to the potential of Russia’s energy blackmail, portending the need for Europe to strategically pivot in the face of this new reality.


About the author

Eleonora Lucia Cammarano is a 2025 candidate for a Master of Arts in International Affairs (MAIA) at Johns Hopkins University SAIS. She graduated with a capstone project on Environmental Peacebuilding at John Cabot University in 2023 summa cum laude in International Affairs, double minor in Philosophy and Economics. Eleonora’s main interests lie in the intersections of climate change and security, effective peace interventions, and Global South perspectives. 


Endnotes

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the editors or the journal.