The 2025 Space Guardrails Initiative: Leading the Call for a Modernized International Treaty on Military Space Activity
Representatives vote on a draft resolution on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space during a Security Council meeting at the UN headquarters, April 24, 2024. Source: UN Photo | Handout Via Xinhua
By Grace Klopp
In 2019, Former Secretary of Defense, Patrick Shanahan, stated that the establishment of the U.S. Space Force (USSF) would “fundamentally transform our approach to space from a combat support function to a warfighting domain.” [1] In the following years, China’s military has undergone massive restructuring and modernization efforts to address the growing perception of space as a warfighting frontier. USSF has also voiced suspicion of China’s emerging “dogfighting satellites” and Russia’s anti-satellite (ASAT), potentially nuclear-capable satellites. [2] While great powers managed to avoid Cold War space conflicts, today’s military space projects are comparatively affordable, technologically feasible, and strategic.
Worryingly, the legal frameworks governing military space activity remain remarkably outdated despite the increasing feasibility of space threats. The United States has a unique opportunity to lead the charge in modernizing the space playbook internationally. By proactively crafting a binding space policy on military conduct, the U.S. will protect the final frontier for the free world and prevent potentially catastrophic space warfare.
Failure to Modernize the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
Today’s international framework on military space policy hinges primarily on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST). [3] The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed the OST to curb the escalating Cold War arms race before it reached space. The United States had just carried out Starfish Prime and the USSR had conducted Project K; both operations tested nuclear weapons at high altitudes. The results of Starfish Prime’s thermonuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) blew out 300 streetlights in Hawaii and shut down telephone calls from the island of Kauai. [4] Disturbed by the potentially disastrous use of EMPs, the United States helped pioneer UN discussions on the peaceful uses of outer space, build consensus with the USSR and United Kingdom on a multilateral de-escalation treaty, and secure signatures from all major spacefaring nations. [5] The OST serves as the constitutional foundation of space law to this day, with the majority of its provisions fully in effect. However, the treaty was drafted long before the development of modern space technologies like kinetic ASAT missiles, “killer” satellites, and space lasers. [6] As emerging technology creates loopholes in the OST, the treaty grows increasingly ambiguous, widening the space militarization legal vacuum.
For example, OST Article IV states that parties “shall not place in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction.” [7] In early 2024, U.S. intelligence warned that Russia may be developing a space-based anti-satellite system with a nuclear component. [8] Despite Russia denying any development of a weapon that violated the OST, U.S. officials warned that if Russia’s weapon was not “placed in orbit” (e.g., remained in suborbital trajectory or launched temporarily), or if it launched a dual-use, nuclear-powered satellite, Russia could claim OST compliance despite weaponized intent. Official Russian statements say that the mission of satellite Kosmos 2553 is to test instruments in a “radiation and heavy charged particle” environment. However, because both radiation-shielding, hardened electronics, and long-duration stability are required for both scientific missions and potential nuclear-related counterspace systems, Kosmos 2553 fits the emerging pattern of dual-use ambiguity in space technology. [9] To make matters worse, the OST lacks enforcement mechanisms, allowing countries to further exploit ambiguity by developing dual-use capabilities unchecked.
While U.S. adversaries are beginning to exploit the limitations of the OST, spacefaring nations have failed to reaffirm the treaty. In April 2024, UN Security Council members could not reach unanimous support for either of two OST reaffirmations—one jointly drafted by the U.S. and Japan, and the other by Russia. [10] The U.S.-Japan draft not only sought to reaffirm the ban of nuclear weapons in orbit, but also called on members to stop development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) specifically destined for orbit, tackling a perceived loophole in the aged OST (which previously did not include the word “develop”). [11] Russia rejected the draft and proposed its own amendment: fundamentally expand the scope of the OST by banning all types of weapons in outer space. The United States and several other states rejected Russia’s amendment, stating it was too expansive, lacking in clarity, and lacking in consensus mechanisms. [12] This failure highlighted the core challenge of updating the OST: space powers are unwilling to constrain their military options for fear that adversaries will cheat under the guise of dual-use weaponry.
Going Forward: Addressing Barriers
I propose that the United States embark on the leadership path of a gradual but intentional international space militarization policy reform, dubbed the 2025 Space Guardrails Initiative (SGI). The SGI will affirm the OST and establish reciprocal verification and transparency measures. Few U.S. policymakers want to vote for losing an emerging strategic edge in a domain as critical as space; many of them perceive that arms-control and space-governance treaties will hurt U.S. dominance by constraining freedom of action in ways that competing countries may ignore or exploit. Still, the United States has historically led the charge when negotiating international treaties to preserve the space frontier. Heavy U.S. involvement is crucial to updating international space law because it is the principal space actor, the primary provider of verification capabilities, and the center of global commercial space activity. For the SGI to gain bipartisan, domestic approval, advocates will need to convince defense appropriators and the U.S. defense industry that:
Reaffirmation is not disarmament: Avoid the lens of arms control and assure U.S. policymakers that the United States will not give up space-based military capabilities like missile defense.
Reaffirmation protects our satellites: Pitch OST reaffirmation and all future SGI programs as “protecting critical U.S. space infrastructure and preserving freedom of action in orbit.” Reaffirming the OST’s ban on WMDs in orbit reduces the risk of a devastating nuclear EMP space attack. [13]
Legal gray zones must be closed: Russia and China have proposed vague, maximalist space arms control treaties that “ban all weapons in space” but do not address dual-use capabilities. By reaffirming the OST, the United States can preempt efforts by adversaries to set the terms of future treaties. [14]
Demonstrating credibility and leadership is valuable: Leadership of global space policy reinforces U.S. commitment to a rules-based international order and strengthens alliances with partners in NATO, the Indo-Pacific, and the Global South. The United States can label non-participants as rogue actors violating global norms.
To gain approval of the SGI on the global scale, our U.S. policymakers and UN representatives must convince other spacefaring countries that:
Reaffirmation does not prevent countries from building space defenses: OST reaffirmation blocks destabilizing weapons but allows for missile defense.
Verification and transparency tools are critical: Emerging dual-use technology makes transparency critical to confidence-building. The United States can reaffirm existing WMD bans and strengthen trust by establishing reciprocal transparency measures to the OST (e.g., satellite maneuvering, data-gathering). These tools do not require countries to relinquish any capabilities, but only to disclose military space behavior.
Preventing space nuclear weapons serves Chinese and Russian interests: A nuclear detonation in orbit would devastate China’s Beidou and civilian space systems. OST reaffirmation would temporarily remove scrutiny from Russia’s ambiguous dual-use satellite testing.
International treaties stabilize the space environment for all: By taking steps towards future dialogue, the United States and other spacefaring powers can build reciprocal military space agreements that define outdated and vague OST phrases (e.g., “harmful contamination,” “shall not place in orbit…any objects carrying WMDs”).
Opportunity for Proactive Leadership
Domestic and foreign policymakers struggle to adopt proactive approaches due to the breadth and urgency of competing national security priorities. However, if the United States deprioritizes the creation of a modernized space militarization framework, the resulting legal vacuum could trigger a breakdown of international norms and treaties, a spiraling space arms race, loss of critical satellite infrastructure, and dire consequences for humanity.
About the author
Grace Klopp is a 2027 candidate for a Master of Arts at the American University School of International Service. She graduated from the College of William & Mary in 2021 with a double major in International Relations and Chinese. After graduating, she taught English in Chiayi, Taiwan on a Fulbright scholarship. Having worked as a policy analyst in the Department of Defense for several years, Grace’s main career interests lie in the Taiwan strait, U.S.-China relations, military strategy, and U.S. defense policy.
Endnotes
[1] “General Government Gross Debt,” International Monetary Fund, n.d., https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GGXWDG_NGDP@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD.
[2] “Finance and Investment for Climate Goals,” OECD, n.d., https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/finance-and-investment-for-climate-goals.html.
[3] “To Protect Galápagos Islands, Ecuador Turns to Innovative Financing,” A Fact Sheet From the Pew Bertarelli Ocean Legacy Project, May 2023, https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2023/09/to_protect_galapagos_ecuador_turns_to_innovative_funding.pdf; Adam Tomášek,“Debt for Nature Coalition,” Debt for Nature Coalition, October 5, 2025, https://www.debtfornature.org/case-studies-blog/amazon.
[4] World Economic Forum, “This is Ecuador’s historic debt-for-nature deal,” June 9, 2023, accessed October 21, 2025, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/06/ecuadors-historic-debt-for-nature-deal/; Tess Woolfenden, “Debt-for-nature Swaps Reduce Debt Seven Times Less Than Debt Restructurings,” Debt Justice, May 29, 2025, https://debtjustice.org.uk/press-release/debt-for-nature-swaps-reduce-debt-seven-times-less-than-debt-restructurings.
[5] IDB, “Ecuador Completes World’s Largest Debt-for-Nature Conversion With IDB and DFC Support,” n.d., https://www.iadb.org/en/news/ecuador-completes-worlds-largest-debt-nature-conversion-idb-and-dfc-support.
[6] Aruna Chandrasekhar and Yanine Quiroz, “Q&A: Can Debt-for-nature ‘Swaps’ Help Tackle Biodiversity Loss and Climate Change?” Carbon Brief, July 16, 2024, https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-can-debt-for-nature-swaps-help-tackle-biodiversity-loss-and-climate-change/.
[7] Martin Kessler, “Debt-to-Sustainability Swaps (D2S): A Practical Framework,” FinDevLab, April 21, 2025, https://findevlab.org/debt-to-sustainability-swaps-d2s-a-practical-framework/.
[8] “Ecuador ‘B-’ Ratings Affirmed On Debt-For-Nature Swap; Outlook Remains Negative,” S&P Global, December 9, 2024, accessed October 21, 2025, https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/type/HTML/id/3297194.
[9] DB, “Ecuador Completes World’s Largest Debt-for-Nature Conversion.”
[10] Andre Standing, “Galapagos Debt-swap: ‘These Deals Are Being Used to Privatize the Management of Strategic Areas Without the Consent of Those Who Inhabit These Territories’,” Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements, June 9, 2025., https://www.cffacape.org/publications-blog/galapagos-debt-swap-these-deals-are-being-used-to-privatize-the-management-of-strategic-areas-without-the-consent-of-those-who-inhabit-these-territories.
[11] Ibid
[12] DFC, “Financial Close Reached in Largest Debt Conversion for Marine Conservation to Protect the Galápagos,” May 9, 2023, https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/financial-close-reached-largest-debt-conversion-marine-conservation-protect.
[13] Ibid
[14] Ibid
[15] GLF, “Home - GLF,” November 9, 2025, https://galapagoslifefund.org.ec/?utm.
[16] Sophia Green, “Innovative Financing Tool Helps Protect Galápagos Islands,” Pew Bertarelli Ocean Legacy, February 11, 2025, https://www.pew-bertarelli-ocean-legacy.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2024/12/innovative-financing-tool-helps-protect-galapagos-islands.
[17] Maria Luisa Gambale, “Debt-for-Nature Swaps Are Failing the Global South - PassBlue,” PassBlue, August 8, 2024, https://passblue.com/2024/08/05/debt-for-nature-swaps-are-failing-to-end-global-souths-money-woes/.
[18] Gambale, “Debt-for-Nature Swaps Are Failing the Global South.”
[19] DFC, “Financial Close Reached in Largest Debt Conversion.”
[20] Standing, “Galápagos Debt-Swap.”
[21] Sarah Glendon, “Ecuador’s $650 Million Debt-for-nature Swap Targets Galápagos Protection,” Columbia Threadneedle, n.d.; https://www.columbiathreadneedle.com/en/gb/intermediary/insights/ecuadors-650-million-debt-for-nature-swap-targets-galapagos-protection/.
[24] Latindadd, “Summary of the Debt-swap for Nature in the Galapagos Islands,” August 21, 2025, https://latindadd.org/informes/summary-of-the-debt-swap-for-natur-in-the-galapagos-islands/; Standing, “Galápagos Debt-Swap.”.
[22] Pablo Laixhay and Maxime Perriot, “Debt-for-nature swaps 2.0, a deceptive solution,” Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt, n.d., https://www.cadtm.org/Debt-for-nature-swaps-2-0-a-deceptive-solution.
[23] Dennis Essers, Danny Cassimon, and Martin Prowse, “Debt-for-climate swaps: Killing two birds with one stone?” Global Environmental Change, November 2021; Marcos Chamon, Erik Klok, Vimal V Thakoor, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, “Debt-for-Climate Swaps: Analysis, Design, and Implementation,” International Monetary Fund, August 12, 2022, https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2022/08/11/debt-for-climate-swaps-analysis-design-and-implementation-522184.
[24] Debt Justice, “Debt-for-nature Swaps Reduce Debt Seven Times Less Than Debt Restructurings,” May 29, 2025,https://debtjustice.org.uk/press-release/debt-for-nature-swaps-reduce-debt-seven-times-less-than-debt-restructurings.
[25] Standing, “Galápagos Debt-Swap.”
[26] Marc Jones, “Record Galapagos debt-for-nature swap scrutinized over transparency irregularities claims,” Reuters, September 27, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/record-galapagos-debt-for-nature-swap-scrutinized-over-transparency-2024-09-27/.
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the editors or the journal.