Population, Power, and Security: Demographic Pressures Shaping U.S.-China Strategic Competition
Elderly Chinese men playing draughts. Source: Creative Commons
By Tahina Montoya, Kelly Atkinson, Kelly Piazza, Michael Pollard
Introduction
U.S.-China relations reflect an enduring strategic rivalry, with both sides viewing the other as a principal challenge to advancing their vital interests. [1] While this competition is often attributed to ideology, military power, and economics, demographics are an understated factor that increasingly shape its long-term trajectory. Population trends influence labor supply, economic growth, technological capacity, and military recruitment, which are all core foundations of national power.
Both the United States and China face demographic challenges rooted in different causes, which unfold along distinct trajectories. In China, decades of fertility control under the one-child policy accelerated population aging, contributed to a constrained labor force, and reinforced a significant gender imbalance. [2] China’s weak institutional capacity to support its population through unevenly distributed social service programs compounds challenges. [3] While China avoids framing its demographic pressures as a national crisis, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) increasing emphasis on fertility-focused reforms suggests a growing recognition of their long-term economic and social implications. In the United States, fertility decline has been more gradual, but inconsistent immigration policy, rising dependency ratios, [4] and worsening population health pose risks to national security.
In this paper, the authors assess that demographic dynamics are already influencing the balance of U.S.-China competition and will continue to do so in the decades ahead. The paper advances a framework to examine how demographic changes shape long-term strategic competition and integrates key factors—including fertility decline, population aging, and labor force contraction—into a three-part framework of demographic composition, population health, and demographic power. Applying this framework demonstrates how similar demographic challenges manifest differently across the United States and China and highlights the strategic implications of these differences. This comparative analysis enables decisionmakers to evaluate the role demographics play in U.S.-China strategic competition and to consider policy options that preserve and expand U.S. strategic advantage.
Developing a Framework of Demographic Pressures
To develop a novel framework for assessing demographic pressures, this analysis draws on three key dimensions adapted from literature addressing political demography: [5] demographic composition, population health, and demographic power. Together, these dimensions capture distinct ways in which population dynamics shape national strength:
Demographic composition describes the structure of a population through indicators such as fertility rates, age distribution, dependency ratios, and the rural-urban divide. These factors influence the balance between working-age and dependent populations, the sustainability of labor and welfare systems, and long-term economic and strategic potential of a country.
Population health reflects the vitality and sustainability of a population. Indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, and youth health [6] highlight a society’s ability to maintain productive workforces and care for aging cohorts.
Demographic power captures how demographic trends are translated into national capacity. Immigration and emigration flows, economic vitality, and education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) determine whether demographic pressures result in resilience or weakness.
Figure 1 illustrates this framework, which provides a structured way to compare countries’ demographic trends and assess their implications for long-term strategic competition.
Applying the Framework of Demographic Pressures
Demographic Composition: Total Fertility Rates
To maintain population size across generations without immigration, a total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1, known as the “replacement level,” is required. [7] Both the United States and China currently exhibit total fertility rates well below the replacement level of 2.1, as seen in Figure 2: since 2000, China’s total fertility rate has fallen to roughly 0.99—less than half of replacement—while U.S. fertility declined more gradually to about 1.62, with projections suggesting continued sub-replacement fertility in both countries. [8] Absent substantial immigration or major policy change, neither country is likely to achieve long-term population stability. [9] China’s sustained sub-replacement fertility has accelerated population aging and an inversion in age structure, with a shrinking working-age population supporting a rapidly expanding elderly cohort. [10]
Figure 2. Total Fertility Rate, China and the U.S.: 2000-2050
SOURCE: RAND analysis of United Nations World Population Prospects Data (World Bank, 2025).
Sustained low fertility can contribute to demographic, economic, and national security challenges. In China, persistent low fertility rates may intensify intergenerational burdens and the legacy of the 4-2-1 family structure. [11][12] In the United States, fertility decline may exacerbate constraints on military recruitment and defense workforce readiness. [13] Together, these demographic pressures may shape China’s approach to Taiwan in relation to U.S. capacity to sustain defense preparedness.
Demographic Composition: Population Pyramids
Population pyramids capture how low fertility rates translate into shrinking youth cohorts and shifting age distributions. As shown in Figure 3, China’s population in 2020 still reflected a large working-age cohort alongside a relatively small youth population and a growing elderly segment, signaling the end of its demographic dividend—a period of sustained economic growth supported by a large working-age population. By 2050, the population pyramid is projected to invert, with a distinctly smaller base, a reduced labor force, and a rapidly expanding elderly population. [14] This shift indicates accelerating population aging and rising dependency burdens that can increasingly constrain China’s economic and strategic capacity. [15]
Figure 3. Comparing Population Pyramids for China
SOURCE: RAND analysis of United Nations World Population Prospects Data (World Bank, 2025).
In contrast, Figure 4 illustrates the United States’ comparatively stable age structure. The U.S. population pyramid remains broadly rectangular from 2020 through 2050, with only modest base narrowing and gradual expansion of older cohorts, reflecting a slower and more manageable aging trajectory.
Figure 4. Comparing Population Pyramids for the United States
SOURCE: RAND analysis of United Nations World Population Prospects Data (World Bank, 2025).
Although the United States will also face rising dependency ratios, its demographic trajectory remains comparatively stable, while China is undergoing a sharper and more destabilizing demographic transformation.
Demographic Composition: Dependency Ratios
Figure 5 illustrates dependency ratios, capturing the balance between working-age populations and dependents. Higher ratios indicate increased economic and fiscal burdens as fewer workers support larger dependent populations.
Figure 5: China and U.S. Dependency Ratios Over Time
SOURCE: RAND analysis of United Nations World Population Prospects Data (World Bank, 2025).
Both China and the United States face rising dependency ratios, though the underlying dynamics and implications differ slightly. China is projected to lose hundreds of millions of workers, driving a rapid increase in dependency burdens, [16] while the U.S. labor force is projected to expand by roughly 13 percent between 2020 and 2050. [17][18] In China, rising dependency is driven primarily by rapid population aging and labor force contraction; in contrast, the United States experiences a more gradual increase shaped by longer lifespans and sustained population growth. As a result, while dependents in both countries may approach 70 percent of the working-age population, similar ratios mask different realities. One is driven by contraction and rapid aging, the other by slower, more balanced demographic change.
In China, underdeveloped social safety nets and limited eldercare capacity can heighten fiscal and social stress, potentially increasing the likelihood that resources will be diverted away from defense, education, and international engagement. [19] These pressures may prompt Beijing to prioritize foreign investments with direct domestic economic or technological returns over broader diplomatic outreach. [20] In the United States, aging poses a less severe but still meaningful challenge, potentially increasing pressure on Social Security, healthcare, and military recruitment. [21]
Taken together, rising dependency ratios are likely to constrain both countries’ strategic capacity, but more acutely in China where fiscal pressures threaten to outpace adaptation. The United States retains greater room to adjust, provided it addresses demographic risks before they intensify. [22]
Demographic Composition: Urbanization
Urbanization trends highlight differences in how China and the United States manage demographic pressures. China’s urbanization has risen rapidly since 2000 and is projected to continue increasing, though satellite-based measures suggest urban growth may be nearing saturation and that rural populations are disproportionately older. [23] The United States, by contrast, reached high levels of urbanization earlier and is projected to experience only gradual additional urban growth. [24]
While both countries face urban–rural disparities in health, wealth, and access to services, [25] China’s challenges are magnified by the hukou system, [26] which restricts labor mobility and access to social services. [27] In the United States, rural populations are generally older and less healthy, but do not face comparable institutional barriers. [28] As a result, urban–rural inequalities pose a more acute constraint on China’s labor supply, social stability, and state capacity, while in the United States they primarily risk exacerbating labor shortages, regional disparities, and pressures on local health systems.
Population Health: Life Expectancy
Life expectancy trends reveal divergent population trajectories in China and the United States. China has achieved rapid gains in life expectancy since 1950 and is projected to surpass eighty-three years by 2050, while U.S. life expectancy has grown more slowly and is now projected to gradually converge with China’s rising trajectory. [29] As of 2023, U.S. life expectancy trails that of other high-income countries by more than two years, signaling mounting vulnerabilities for workforce resilience and national security. [30] Although national averages obscure persistent rural disadvantages in China, [31] we assess that China’s steady gains are strengthening its population health profile, while U.S. stagnation underscores mounting vulnerabilities, including risks to workforce resilience, rising health costs, and broader national security.
Population Health: Infant Mortality Rates
Infant mortality rates are now broadly comparable in China and the United States at roughly five deaths per 1,000 live births, but underlying trajectories differ sharply. [32] China has reduced infant mortality by nearly 85 percent since 2000, while U.S. progress has been modest and remains among the weakest in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), highlighting a widening gap in progress and relative performance despite similar current rates.
Population Health: Disability-Adjusted Life Years
Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) highlight stark differences in overall disease burden between China and the United States. In 2021, DALYs per 100,000 people were substantially higher in the United States than in China despite far greater U.S. health spending. [33] While China’s lower average disease burden masks significant urban–rural disparities, [34] persistently poor U.S. health outcomes may erode its demographic advantage and pose risks to workforce resilience and military readiness, particularly with declining youth fitness and eligibility to serve. [35]
Demographic Power: Immigration/Emigration
Figure 6 illustrates net international migration trends, highlighting a stark contrast between the United States and China. Since 1980, China has experienced consistently negligible net international migration, while the United States has sustained positive—though fluctuating—levels of net migration, underscoring immigration’s role in offsetting U.S. demographic pressures. [36]
Figure 6: U.S. and China Net International Migration and Natural Change
SOURCE: RAND analysis of United Nations World Population Prospects Data (World Bank, 2025).
Immigration provides the United States with a significant demographic advantage by sustaining labor force growth and mitigating the effects of low fertility and aging. [37] Absent immigration, U.S. population growth would already be negative, [38] while China’s lack of immigration inflows has accelerated its demographic decline. The U.S. advantage, however, is contingent on consistent immigration policy; polarization or restrictive shifts could quickly erode immigration’s stabilizing role.
Demographic Power: Economic Vitality
While the relationship between population dynamics and economic growth is complex, research shows that demographic trends shape per capita output in ways conditioned by age structure and country-specific factors. [39] In China, historical evidence suggests that population size exerted a negative effect on GDP per capita, while savings, industrialization, and technological change were more important drivers of growth. [40] More recent analyses indicate that demographic aging and slowing capital accumulation are likely to dampen growth further, with excess savings becoming a constraint rather than a driver. [41]
Overall, population aging is expected to slow growth in both China and the United States, though more sharply in China. While innovation and structural change can mitigate labor-force decline, [42] empirical evidence from OECD economies links aging to productivity slowdowns. [43] In the United States, aging has already reduced GDP per capita growth and is projected to exert increasing downward pressure as the share of the population over age sixty continues to rise. [44] China’s demographic headwinds are likely to be stronger, given the speed and scale of its aging trajectory. These constraints are already influencing China’s external economic behavior. As population aging reduces China’s lifecycle surplus and increases domestic fiscal pressures, the pool of resources available for external investment is likely to tighten. [45] Consistent with this shift, China has moved toward more selective overseas lending and a greater emphasis on foreign investments with clearer economic or strategic return, including a recalibration of Belt and Road activities. [46]
Demographic Power: STEM Education
STEM education serves as a key component of demographic power by shaping a country’s ability to translate population size into innovation and productivity. [47] China has dramatically expanded access to tertiary education since 2000, resulting in a much larger pipeline of STEM graduates than the United States. [48] China now outpaces the United States across multiple STEM indicators, including doctoral output and overall scale of research institutions. [49]
Enrollment figures, however, mask important quality differences. China’s higher-education system is uneven, with elite institutions producing world-class talent alongside many programs of lower quality. [50] The United States, while facing challenges of access and scale, continues to maintain a concentration of high-quality institutions that attract global talent. [51]
China’s sustained investment in STEM education—initiated during the one-child policy era—may reflect a deliberate strategy to offset demographic decline and limited immigration by boosting innovation, economic growth, and military modernization. [52] These investments could strengthen China’s long-term competitiveness, while the United States risks a widening gap unless it reinforces STEM education and innovation capacity.
Assessing National Security Implications from Demographic Pressures
Demographic pressures pose growing risks to U.S. national security, and China’s experience offers important lessons for anticipating and mitigating similar challenges. In China, demographic decline has already reshaped domestic priorities, driving pronatalist policies, reforms to the hukou system, and increased investment in education and technology. The United States currently benefits from a more favorable demographic position—supported by slower aging, moderately higher fertility, and an immigration-driven workforce. We summarize key comparative insights from demographic pressures in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparing U.S.-China Demographic Pressures [53]
| Demographic Pressure Category | Indicator | China (2000 → Most Recent) | U.S. (2000 → Most Recent) | Key Takeaway |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Demographic Composition | Total Fertility Rate (TFR) | 1.63 → 0.99 (2023) Legacy of One-Child Policy and fertility below replacement since 1991 | 2.03 → 1.62 (2023) Fertility below replacement since 2008 |
|
| Demographic Composition | Aging Population | Rapid aging, insufficient social safety net | More gradual aging, fiscal strain on social security programs |
|
| Demographic Composition | Urbanization (percent urban) | Rapid urbanization (35.9 → 66.5) (2025) Hukou system exacerbating barriers | Gradual and less disruptive urbanization (79.1 → 83.7) (2025) |
|
| Demographic Composition | Total/Old-Age Dependency Ratios | 46.1 → 43.5 (2025) (Total) 10.3 → 21.4 (2025) (Old Age) |
50.0 → 55.0 (2025) (Total) 18.3 → 28.5 (2024) (Old Age) |
|
| Population Health | Life Expectancy (years) | (72.3 → 78) | (76.8 → 79.3) |
|
| Population Health | Infant Mortality (per 1,000 live births) and DALYS | Steep decline in infant mortality rate (27.9 → 5.1) | Gradual decline in infant mortality rate (7.2 → 5.3) |
|
| Population Health | Overall and Youth Health / DALYs | Lower health burden despite rapid aging | Higher health burden despite greater healthcare spending |
|
| Demographic Power | Immigration / Emigration (per 1,000 pop.) | Homogenous society with minimal net international immigration (-0.03 percent net outflow) | Population growth sustained primarily by immigration (+ 0.4 percent net inflow) |
|
| Demographic Power | Labor Force & Economy | Risk of "Middle Income Trap" | Labor gaps at high and low skill levels |
|
| Demographic Power | Education Accessibility and Emphasis on STEM (graduates) | Dramatic increase in: Tertiary education enrollment (7.6 → 53.8 percent) (2019) STEM PhDs (7,766 → 39,768) (2018) |
Steady increase in: Tertiary education enrollment (67.8 → 88.3 percent) (2018) STEM PhDs (26,086 → 41,071) (2018) |
|
Demographic Composition Implications
China’s demographic composition is shifting rapidly as declining fertility, workforce contraction, and population aging place growing demands on state resources. Although these trends are unlikely to significantly affect People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel levels or combat readiness in the near-term given China’s modest recruitment needs and large pool of unemployed youth, [54] they will necessitate resource reallocation toward social welfare and eldercare, potentially constraining China’s capacity to project power globally. These pressures may also generate short-term strategic risks if Beijing acts before demographic constraints deepen, potentially accelerating timelines for externally focused priorities such as Taiwan.
Evidence suggests that demographic and fiscal pressures are already influencing China’s external behavior. Recent analysis indicates that, as demographic aging and slowing capital accumulation dampen China’s growth, Beijing has recalibrated aspects of its Belt and Road Initiative, scaling back large infrastructure projects in favor of smaller, commercially viable investments and redirecting resources toward domestic economic stabilization. [55] Such shifts highlight a growing prioritization of initiatives with direct domestic or strategic returns, including those tied to economic resilience and geopolitical positioning, over expansive global influence. These dynamics may create opportunities for the United States to reduce Chinese leverage in key regions and strengthen security partnerships while also underscoring the need for preparedness should China accelerate its approach toward Taiwan.
To manage these risks, U.S. policymakers should integrate demographic indicators into interagency assessments of China’s strategic behavior, drawing on analytic frameworks within the National Intelligence Council and the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research to provide early warning of shifts in resource allocation or foreign policy priorities. [56]
At the same time, the United States must address its own demographic constraints. Persistently low fertility and rising old-age dependency may place increasing pressure on the workforce, with immigration projected to become the sole driver of U.S. population growth after 2033. [57] Sustaining a coherent and consistent immigration policy will be essential to maintaining labor supply, supporting critical sectors, and preserving long-term economic and security readiness.
Population Health Implications
China’s strained social systems, gender imbalance, and widening rural–urban divide are likely to accelerate demographic decline and increasingly shape the CCP’s prioritization of domestic stability relative to long-term international ambitions. For U.S. policymakers, monitoring these demographic stressors can help identify when internal pressures may begin to constrain China’s external behavior or influence its risk tolerance, creating opportunities to shape competitive strategy.
Integrating demographic indicators into interagency intelligence assessments and futures analysis—such as those conducted through National Intelligence Council assessments and Department of War analytic initiatives—can improve early warning of potential inflection points in China’s external posture. [58] Such analysis could inform U.S. defense posture, economic policy, and diplomatic engagement, including efforts to counter or capitalize on shifts in China’s overseas investment as demographic and labor pressures mount. [59]
At the same time, the United States faces its own demographic health challenges. Declining youth fitness and a shrinking pool of medically eligible recruits, combined with low military propensity to serve, may pose near-term readiness risks, while population aging continues to strain social security, healthcare, and veterans’ systems. [60] Sustaining U.S. national power will therefore require proactive investment in population health, workforce readiness, and eldercare — such as strengthening preventive healthcare, improving youth fitness and workforce training, and expanding sustainable childcare and eldercare systems— to mitigate long-term economic and defense pressures.
Demographic Power Implications
Demographic power shapes national resilience and strategic influence by determining how effectively states convert population characteristics into economic and technological capacity. In China, internal stratification reinforced by the hukou system constrains labor mobility and limits the country’s ability to offset population aging and workforce shortages, helping explain Beijing’s growing reliance on automation, artificial intelligence, and advanced technologies to sustain productivity and growth. [61] While these investments may partially mitigate demographic decline, they also reflect structural constraints that could limit China’s long-term competitiveness.
By contrast, the United States retains a significant demographic advantage through immigration, which can sustain workforce growth and innovation even amid low fertility and population aging. This advantage, however, depends on consistent and well-managed immigration policy. Polarization or restrictive shifts risk eroding U.S. demographic resilience and narrowing the United States’ existing strategic demographic advantage over China.
Conclusion
Demographic dynamics shape national security through three interrelated dimensions—composition, health, and power—and provide valuable insight into the trajectory of strategic competition. For U.S. policymakers, assessing China’s demographic challenges can inform evaluations of Beijing’s long-term defense spending, military readiness, and global influence, particularly as aging and labor contraction constrain internal capacity. [62] For example, China’s growing emphasis on social stability and domestic welfare spending may further limit its ability to sustain overseas initiatives or prolonged military operations, including elements of the Belt and Road Initiative. [63] At the same time, tracking investments in artificial intelligence and STEM education can help identify areas of intensified competition or potential U.S. advantage. [64]
As demographic pressures intensify, China’s ability to sustain simultaneous investments in domestic social programs and global influence is likely to diminish, forcing clearer tradeoffs that could reshape its foreign policy trajectory. [65] Monitoring these adjustments, while remaining attentive to U.S. demographic vulnerabilities, can help policymakers leverage demographic insights to preserve strategic advantage. Although immigration is a critical pillar of U.S. demographic resilience, long-term strength ultimately rests on broader adaptability through innovation, education, and responsive governance. Institutionalizing demographic analysis within U.S. strategic forecasting, intelligence, and defense-planning frameworks—such as those led by the National Intelligence Council and the Department of War—can strengthen the government’s ability to anticipate how population trends shape China’s global capacity and inform U.S. policy responses.
About the author
Tahina Montoya is a policy researcher, an adjunct professor at George Washington University and the Inter-American Defense College, and a Presidential Leadership Scholar. She conducts research on issues of national security policy and international affairs, with a focus on security cooperation and human security. Dr. Montoya holds a PhD in liberal studies with a certificate in gender, peace and security from Georgetown University.
Kelly Atkinson is a political scientist and a Term Member at the Council on Foreign Relations. She conducts research on issues of military personnel policy, international security, and human security. Dr. Atkinson holds a PhD in political science and women’s studies from the Ohio State University.
Kelly Piazza is a political scientist, a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, and a Term Member at the Council on Foreign Relations. She conducts mixed-methods research on strategic competition, U.S. foreign policy, and demographic quality and stability. Dr. Piazza holds a PhD in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Michael Pollard is a sociologist and a professor of demography. He conducts research on social networks and health (physical, mental, and health behaviors), demography, and public perceptions. Dr. Pollard holds a PhD in sociology from Duke University.
Endnotes
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[4] Dependency ratios measure the balance between the working-age population and those typically considered dependents, such as children and older adults. Higher ratios indicate that fewer workers are supporting a larger dependent population.
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[6] Youth health refers to the physical, mental, and developmental well-being of children and adolescents, as reflected in indicators such as nutrition, obesity, disease burden, fitness, and access to care, which together influence future workforce, resilience, military eligibility, and long-term demographic sustainability.
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[15] Strategic capacity refers to a state’s ability to mobilize economic, technological, and human resources to pursue and sustain its national security and foreign policy objectives.
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[18] While this analysis focuses on structural demographic trends, labor force outcomes are also shaped by factors such as participation rates, retirement age, gender participation patterns, and broader socioeconomic conditions
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[29] United Nations, “World Population Prospects.”
[30] Ibid.
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[34] Rozelle and Hell, Invisible China.
[35] Jones and Dolsten, “Healthcare on the Brink.”
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